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THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS
By BERNARD C. GAVITO
(Continued from Jpril Journal)

IV
An interpretative or expository act is said to invade the
judicial function because it is an exposition of the existing
law rather than a statement of a rule for future conduct. The
cases rather uniformly accept that distinction as the determining factor, for it is conceded that an act of the legislature
which in truth only lays down a rule as to future conduct is
a proper exercise of the legislative function.
The first problem, then, is one of construction. Did the
legislature "intend" 51 it to be only retroactive, only prospective, or did it intend it to be both?
*Dean of the Indiana University School of Law.
59 It is not within the province of this article to discuss the problem of "the
intention of the legislature." It is suggested, however, that much of the confusion on the subject arises out of the simple failure to recognize that the
test here is seldom, if ever, a truly subjective one. Such a test is in truth a
physical impossibility. There is obviously no such thing as the actual composite intention of a legislature which is expressed in legislative action, except
in those very rare cases where a majority of the members actually participate
in and understand the action taken. The test is usually and necessarily an
objective one, and the solution of the problem is the result of an attempt to
give specific meaning to what in form is a general statement with very general
possible content. Language being what it is; words being capable of infinite
exploitation; and everyone being his own dictionary; the problem of giving
specific meaning and application to any formal expression of thought is the
problem of reconstructing from dead but elusive langauge the concept (if any)
which prompted it and which it was used to picture. Attempting to find the
"intention" of the legislature is, after all, attempting to reconstruct its ideas,
which at best may have been very vague and confused. The result is an
439
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In any case which arose after the legislative enactment took
effect an utterance on the first or third enquiry is necessarily
a dictum. In such a case the problem simply is, can language
which in form appears to be retroactive be accepted as strictly
prospective? Thus although the legislature says that certain
language "shall be construed to mean," "it shall be held to
mean;" "the true intent thereof shall be deemed to be;" or a
similar expression be used, is there any reason why such a
statute is not a present enactment for future conduct? Is it
not after all only a rather inept way of defining words? Quite
obviously if the legislature defines its words in the same statute the definitions so given are valid. 60 But if it has sought
to define words in a prior enactment, why is not such language simply an amendment or an addition to the prior statute? Unless the second act run afoul of some constitutional
provision on the subject"' there is every reason why it should
be given such effect. It is presumed that a legislative enactment is constitutional ;62 and that therefore the legislature
here was legislating and not judging, if that latter be thought
to be an objection.
application of the reasonable inferences from what was said, and the extrinsic
facts of which the courts take judicial notice. After all, the technic of attempting to apply a common law rule or principle to a specific situation is quite
similar to that of attempting to apply a specific situation to a legislative
utterance.
60 Getz v. Brubaker, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 303 (1904), Schulz v. Parker, 158
Iowa, 42, 139 N. W 173, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 553 (1912), Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S. E. 58 (1930).
61 See, e. ., Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627,
15 A. 917 (1888). Few cases have raised this problem, although it is a serious
one, and a possible objection to most so-called expository statutes, whether
intended to be retroactive or not. The difficulty can be met by setting out the
act as changed. See, e.g., Chicago R. L & P Ry. v. Willis, 75 Okla. 13, 181 P
307 (1919). Or it may be met by incorporating the first act into the second
by reference. See, e.g., Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S. E.
58 (1930).
62 Few, if any, of the cases cited hereafter in this connection specifically
base the decision upon this presumption. See, however, Singer Mfg. Co. v.
McCollock, 24 Fed. 667 (1884), In re City of Northampton, 158 Mass. 299,
33 N. E. 568 (1893). That it ought to be a controlling factor is clear. The
presumption is so common that no citation of authority to prove that it exists
is needed.

THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS

But in any event every statute is by implication a command
to the courts as to how the law shall be construed and applied.
If the legislature has said. "X means Y" it has as a practical
matter said essentially what it says when it enacts that "X
Speaking to the courts in
shall be construed to mean Y"
terms of what they "shall" do is after all simply an impoliteness. If the act in fact deals with future conduct the-objection
is simply a matter of form.
The force of that argument has been recognized and with
very few exceptions it has been held that as applied to a case
arising after the enactment so-called expository, interpretative
or commanding language is to be given effect as an expression of a present legislative intent and does not constitute an
invasion of the judicial function. 63 The few cases to the
contrary should be said to be erroneous for there is no con64
stitutional or common law doctrine of legislative politeness.
63 Nebraska Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N. W 67
(1901), Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 338 (1832), State v. Porter, 24
Tenn. 165 (1844), Stebbins v. Pueblo Co. Com'rs, 4 Fed. 282 (1880), Singer
Mfg. Co. v. McCollock, 24 Fed. 667 (1884), City of Cambridge v. City of
Boston, 130 Mass. 357 (1881), People v. Wilson, 52 Hun. 388, 5 N. Y. S. 280
(1875), Bryan v. Board of Education, 90 Ky. 322, 13 S. W 276 (1890), Clay
v. Central R. & Banking Co., 84 Ga. 345, 10 S. E. 967 (1890), Kern v. Supreme Council Amer. Leg. of Honor, 167 Mo. 471, 67 S. W 252 (1902),
State Board of Assessors v. Plainfield Water Supply Co., 67 N. J. L. 357, 52
A. 230 (1902), Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 310 (1899),
Barnett v. State, 42 Te. Cr. R. 302, 62 S. W 765 (1900), Dilworth v. Schuylkill Imp. Land. Co., 219 Pa. 527, 69 A. 47 (1908), (cf. the Pennsylvania cases
cited ,nfra n. 64), State v. Persica, 130 Tenn. 48, 168 S. W 1056 (1914),
In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 P 352 (1913), People v. Bowman, 247 Ill.
276, 93 N. E. 244 (1910), In re Johnson's Est., 99 Neb. 275, 155 N. W 1100
(1910) reversing, 98 Neb. 799, 154 N. W 550 (1916), Gill v. Goldfield Consol.
Mines Co., 43 Nev. 1, 176 P. 784, 184 P. 309 (1919), Roberts v. Atlantic Oil
Producing Co., 295 F 16 (C. C. A. Ky. 1924), State ex rel. v. Police Jury of
Calcasieu Parish, 161 La. 1, 108 So. 104 (1926), Caylor v. State, 219 Ala. 12,
121 So. 12 (1929), Featherstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 153 S. E. 58 (1930).
If the second act really re-enacts the first act with the proposed changes
added it is valid. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. v. Willis, 75 Okla. 13, 181 P 307
(1919).
64 Gough v. Pratt, 9 Md. 526 (1856) (dictum), Meyer v. Berlandi, 39 Minn.
438, 40 N. W 513, 12 A. S. R. 663, 1 L. R. A. 777 (1888) , Titusville Iron
Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627, 15 A. 917 (1888), Commonwealth
v. Warwick, 172 Pa. St. 140, 33 A. 373 (1895), (cf. Dilworth v. Schuylkill
Imp. Land Co., 219 Pa. 527, 69 A. 47 (1908) "explaining" the Titusville case

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

A case which arose prior to the so-called expository law
presents additional problems. If it be conceded that an expository law is or may be invalid as to past transactions in
the usual case the accepted rules of construction employed
in the instance where a future case is involved would point
to the result that the language employed, although in form
expository, was in truth prospective and therefore inapplicable. In the absence of unusual circumstances the act probably should be interpreted to be only future in its intended
application. If that result is reached as a matter of interpretation there is no direct question of constitutional law involved
because by hypothesis the act was not intended to be retroactive. But it is not impossible that a court may conclude that
the legislature intended that it be exclusively retroactive or
both retroactive and prospective. Either result should, however, call for something more than language which is simply
in form expository If such language is generally interpreted
to be prospective and govern future cases it is because after
all that is the reasonable inference from the entire situation.
If it ought-therefore to be interpreted as prospective it ought
not to be interpreted as retrospective too, unless there is additional evidence which compels that conclusion.
In keeping with this logic a few cases refuse to construe
so-called expository statutes as having been intended as retroactive. A past transaction is held to be governed exclusively
by the law at the time and subsequent legislation although in
form expository is held to be inapplicable.6 5
Some cases have held, however, that a so-called expository
act must be taken at its face value and be construed to have
been intended to be retroactive. In such cases particularly if
the legislative pronouncement is contrary to prior judicial decisions on the same point it is often held that it is invalid as
a legislative invasion of the judicial function. 66 (The truth
as involving a past transaction.), James v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 592, 78 S.W
951 (1904.), State v. Parsons, 206 Iowa 390 220 N. W 328 (1928).
65 Files v. Fuller, 44 Ark. 273 (1884) , Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115 (La.
1874).
66 The fact of intervening contrary judicial decisions is sometimes emphasized and sometimes not. Cotton v. Brien, 6 Rob. 115 (La. 1874), City of New
Orleans v. Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 499 (1874), Lincoln Bldg.
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is, of course, that a subsequent legislature knows no more
about the intention of a prior legislature than does the
court.)

67

If it is not contrary to prior judicial decisions or it

is thought to be a proper interpretation of the first act there
is no practical objection to it, for in effect it reaches the same
result."" Logically, of course, it should be as invalid as a
contrary retroactive rule.69 If there have been no intervening judicial decisions there is some authority for the proposition that the expository retroactive act is valid.70 Again,
Ass'n v. Graham, 7 Neb. 173 (1878), Reiser v. William Tell Say. Fund Ass'n,
39 Pa. St. 137 (1861), Haley v. City of Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45 (1871),
Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444 (1869) (dictum), Houston v. Bogle, 32
N. C. 496 (1849), Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N. C. 391 (1818), Ogden v. Witherspoon, Fed. Case No. 10,461 (1802), State v. McGrath, 95 Mo. 193, 8 S. W
425 (1888), Hunt v. Hunt, 37 Me. 333 (1853), Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358
(1861), Bartlett v. State, 73 Oh. St. 54, 75 N. E. 939 (1905), Weisberg v.
Weisberg, 112 App. Div. 231, 98 N. Y. S. 260 (1906), Lindsay v. United
States Savings & Loan Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L. R. A. 783 (1898),
City of Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront Co., 118 Cal. 160, 50 P 277 (1897),
People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775 (1897), Iowa
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Selby, 111 Iowa, 402, 82 N. W. 968 (1900), Parish of
Caddo v. Parish of Red River, 114 La. 370, 38 So. 274 (1905), Kern v.
Supreme Council Amer. Leg. of Honor, 167 Mo. 471, 67 S. W 252 (1902), In
re Handley's Est., 15 Utah, 212, 49 P 829, 62 A. S. R. 926 (1897), King v.
President, etc. of Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447, 8 A. D. 112 (1819), Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 Mass. 239 (1859), In re Coburn, 165 Cal. 202, 131 P
352 (1913), Merlo v. Johnston City Mining Co., 258 11. 328, 101 N. E. 525
(1913) affg. 173 Ill. App. 425 (1913), People v. Ganly, 170 App. Div. 702,
156 N. Y. S. 671 (1915), Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P 814, Ann.
Cas. 1913D, 1257 (1911), United States v. Salberg, 287 F 208 (D. C. Ohio
1923), Roberts v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 295 F 16 (C. C. A. Ky. 1924),
Blalock v. Miller, 175 Ark. 98, 298 S. W 995 (1927), Epps v. McCallum
Realty Co., 139 S. C. 481, 138 S. E. 297 (1927), Caylor v. State, 219 Ala. 12,
121 So. 12 (1929), Virginia Coupon Cases, 25 Fed. 647 (1885), Schooner
Aurora Borealis v. Dobbie, 17 Ohio, 125 (1848).
A retroactive constitutional amendment is obviously valid. See, Hammond
v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 77 (1911).
67 This is pointed out in People v. The Board of Supervisors of New York,

16 N. Y. 424 (1857).
68

In re Yost, 17 Pa. St. 524 (1851).
69 Accord, McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213 (1851), Bettenbrock v. Miller,
185 Ind. 600, 112 N. E. 771 (1916), Epps v. McCallum Realty Co., 139 S. C.
481, 138 S. E. 297 (1927).
It may be, of course, some evidence as to the meaning of the first act. See
infra n. 77.
70 O'Connor v. Warner, 4 Watts & S. 223 (Pa. 1842) Contra (at least by
implication) Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, Fed. Case 14,367 (4 Biss. 327) (1869),
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however, such a result is logically at variance with the assumption and result in the cases where a contrary judicial decision
had been made.

71

The substantial basis for the cases holding expository acts
as applied to past transactions to be void as an invasion of
the judicial function is rather meagre. If the form of the
enactment is immaterial and therefore an act which is interpretive in form is normally construed to be legislative as
to future transactions, the form of the same enactment should
be construed to be legislative as to past transactions. If
"shall be construed to mean" and similar phrases are construed to be present definitions in the one instance they should
be likewise so construed as to the other. If it announces a
rule as to the future (rather than a decision) it logically (in
the absence of other evidence) announces a rule as to the past
(rather than a decision)
The confusing element is of course
the fact that in announcing a rule a legislature uses the same
processes a court uses when it announces a rule. Any rule
(originally) is in one sense a decision, at least, it is the result
of a decision. The legislature, unless it has acted arbitrarily,
has decided on the evidence available that the pronounced
rule is just, desirable and necessary Making decisions, in
that sense, is not exclusively a judicial function. Thus the
making of rules is clearly not exclusively a judicial function
and again why the retroactive making of rules should be considered such an invasion is difficult to perceive and such a
result is really contrary to the rather controlling authorities
discussed previously
As has been pointed out there retroactive legislation was
originally valid, except in criminal and contract cases, although
it came to receive judicial condemnation as an invasion of the
judicial function. Since the 'Fourteenth Amendment, or a
Salters v. Tobias, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 338 (1832), Iowa Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Selby, 111 Iowa 402, 82 N. W 968 (1900). A good many of the cases cited
in note 66 could be added. There is little authority, therefore, for the principal
proposition.
71 The point has been developed above. See also: City of New Orleans
v. Louisiana Mut. Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 499 (1874), Reiser v. William Tell
Say. Fund Ass'n, 39 Pa. St. 137 (1861), Houston v. Bogle, 32 N. C. 496 (1849),
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1926), 770 et seg.
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similar provision in a state constitution, there is no real occasion for such a holding. Much retroactive legislation is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, or its state equivalent, and cases involving expository and interpretative acts
could better be there decided, rather than under the doctrine
of the separation of powers. That a retroactive act, expository in form, is not necessarily an invalid invasion of the
judicial function is illustrated by those rather numerous cases
which sustain tax, 72 forfeiture, 7 3 and procedural 74 statutes of
that character. The same results follow if the Fourteenth
or Fifth Amendment is applied, because no "vested rights"
are adversely affected. 75 The invalidity here therefore is not
the result of the expository form of the enactment but of
a common law or constitutional principle against retroactive
legislation in some cases. 76 In other words if we investigate
those cases it appears that the real objection here is the
interference with "vested interests" and not the judicial function. Theoretically the judiciary has no more power to interfere with vested interests than has the legislature, so that a
72 See, e.g., Stockdale v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 20 Wall. 323 (1873),
contra: People v. The Board of Supervisors of New York, 16 N. Y. 424,
Baird v. Burke Co., 53 N. D. 140, 205 N. W 17 (1925).
73 See, e.g., Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, Fed. Case 14,367 (4 Biss. 327)
(1869), Parmelee v. Lawrence, 48 Il. 331 (1868), Rood v. Chicago M. & St.
P Ry., 43 Wis. 146 (1877), Epps v. Smith, 121 N. C. 157, 28 S. E. 359 (1897).
74 See, e.g., Planters Bank v. Black, 19 Miss. 43 (1848), Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U. S. 272 (1804), cf. Macartney v. Shipherd, 60 Or. 133, 117 P 814,
Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1257 (1911).
(This case deals with jurisdiction rather than
procedure.)
75 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1926), 770 et seq. In any
case where "vested" interests are not involved retroactive legislation is valid.
Any legislative change is "retroactive" in a sense. See, e.g., White v. United
States, 270 U. S. 175 (1926), Singleton v. Cheek, 284 U. S. 493 (1932).
76 This is, the author concedes, a formal criticism. The courts have the
same power to define their terms as have the legislatures. If a retroactive
enactment which reaches "vested rights" ought to be invalid (and upon that
point judicial opinion seems to be rather compelling) it makes little difference
whether the court explains the result under the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment
or the doctrine of the separation of powers. The form of the law, however,
is important, and an effort should be made to make it symmetrical and logically
consistent. It is on such a basis that the above criticism is offered. One certainly cannot fit all of the cases into the dogma that retroactive legislation is
an invasion of the judicial function.
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retroactive rule can not fairly be said to invade that power.
The cases ought to be decided under the due process clauses.
That a court may receive legislative interpretation as an
aid to judicial interpretation, even as to a past transaction,
is conceded. But it is said to be simply some evidence and
is not conclusive. 77 The interpretation of an act by an administrative board clearly is not binding on the courts. 78
Courts, however, still decide cases of this character on the
basis that there is an invasion of the judicial function even
although a specific constitutional limitation on the subject
proscribes retroactive legislation. 79
It is to be noted that a great many cases turned upon the
fact of an intervening judgment. That, of course, is an additional factor. It is involved also in the cases on "curative
acts" so that its significance is discussed in connection with
those cases.
A curative act is one which openly purports to be retroactive.8 0 Such acts have been attacked as invasions of the
judicial function. This attack has been made although the
legislation in question was not objectionable because in expository form. This group of cases gives the lie most effectively
to the general proposition that the declaration of a past law
is a judicial and not a legislative function for there is a substantial body of cases in this field upholding retroactive legislation as against the objection that there is an invasion of the
judicial function.
77 Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444 (1869), Curtis v. Leavitt, 17 Barb.
309 (N. Y. 1853), Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1876), State
v. Harden, 62 W Va. 313, 58 S. E. 715 (1907), Bettenbrock v. Miller, 185
Ind. 600, 112 N. E. 771 (1916), State v. Police Court of City of Bozeman, 68
Mont. 435, 219 P 810 (1923).
78 West v. Sun Cab Co., 160 Md. 476, 154 A. 100 (1931).
79 See, e. g., Union Schocl Dist. v. Foster Lumber Co., 142 Okla. 260, 286 P
774 (1930).
The
80 All retroactive (indeed all) legislation is in a sense "curative."
cases discussed at this point could well have been discussed immediately above
as the problem involved is essentially the same. The sole distinction is one
of form, because "curative" acts have been attacked as invasions of the judicial
function even although they are not expository in form. As has been pointed
out above the real objection to expository acts is their retroactive effect in
some cases; because in those cases where they are construed not to be retroactive they are usually held to be valid.
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The courts and text-writers have suggested as a test of the
validity of curative acts one of the most meaningless statements in the books. It is commonly said that the legislature
may retroactively dispense with any requirement which it
could have left out in the first instance.81 But in view of the
fact that it could have left out any requirement it wished,
except that which some constitutional limitation prohibits being left out, it can fairly be said that it could have left out
anything it can afterwards cure retroactively The test suggested is obviously tautological, and of no assistance whatever
in the decision of a given case. (Except, of course, that it
always remains true that the legislature cannot change the
constitutions.)
There are two avenues of attack used. One urges that
the curative act interferes with vested rights, the other that
the curative act constitutes a decision on the law and facts as
to the rights of the interested parties. The second objection
cannot often be made unless the act in question is special,
that is, limited to a specific situation, whereas the first objection is made whether the act be special or general. If, for
example, a special act provides that Lot X, the property of
A, a minor, is to be sold by B, his guardian, it nas been urged
that the legislature has decided that A owns Lot X, that he
is a minor, that B is his guardian and that the property ought
to be sold for some supposedly good and legal reason.

2

A

few cases have accepted that argument as convincing and have
held that such special acts are an invasion of the judicial func81 See, e. g., Nottage v. City of Portland, 35 Ore. 539, 58 P 883, 76 A. S. R.
513 (1899), People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E. 493 (1917), Steger v.
Traveling Men's Bldg. & Loan Co., 208 Ill. 236, 70 N. E. 236, 100 A. S. ,.
225 (1904). Apparently this so-called test was invented by Judge Cooley. See
Most cases emButler v. Supervisors of Saginaw Co., 26 Mich. 22 (1872).
ploying it rely upon Judge Cooley's subsequent statement of the rule in his
text on Constitutional Limitations.
82 See, e. g., Lane v. Doe, 4 Ill. (3 Scan.) 238 (1841), Pryor v. Downey,
50 Cal. 388, 19 A. R. 656 (1875), Romer v. Fagan, 46 Ill. 404 (1868), In re
Opinion of the Court, 4 N. H. 572 (1829), Jones v. Perry, 1 Tenn. (10 Yerg.)
59, 30 A. D. 430 (1836), Denny v. Mattoon, 84 Mass. 361, 79 A. D. 784 (1861),
Miller v. Alexander, 122 N. C. 718, 30 S. E. 125 (1898), Harris v. Commis. of
Allegany Co., 130 Md. 488, 100 A. 733, L. R. A. 1917E, 824 (1917), State v.
Adams, 44 Mo. 570 (1869).
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tion because the legislature had decided a case. 83 A few more
cases have reached a similar result if there were already a
general law on the subject matter.8 4 The vast majority of
the cases, however, have ignored the argument, and there is
a large group of them holding special legislation of this character valid.8 5 Those latter cases illustrate that after all the
83 Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. St. (8 Casey) 34 (1858) , Miller
v. Alexander, 122 N. C. 718, 30 S. E. 125 (1898), Arrowsmith v. Burlingin,
Fed. Case No. 563, 4 McLean, 489 (1848), Jackson v. Frost, 5 Cow. 346 (N.
Y. 1826), Mendelson v. State, 240 N. Y. S. 673, 136 Misc. Rep. 242 (1930).
See also the cases cited supra n. 82, Cf. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 627
(1829) ("It purports to be a legislative resolution and not a decree." p. 660).
84 Lane v. Doe, 4 Il1. (3 Scam.) 238 (1841), Lincoln v. Alexander, 52 Cal.
482, 28 A. R. 639 (1877).
85 The following cases involve the sale of trust property where the trustee
previously had no power of sale: Stanley v. Colt, 72 U. S. 119 (1866),
Sohler v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1 (1871), Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. St. (2
Barr.) 277 (1845) (This case is subsequently said to involve minors and to
be valid for that reason. See, Ervine's Appeal cited infra n. 85.), Kerr v.
Kitchen, 17 Pa. St. (5 Harris) 433 (1851), In re Van Home, 18 R. I. 389, 28
A. 341 (1893). Contra: Shoenberger v. School Directors, 32 Pa. St. (8 Casey)
34 (1858).
The following cases involve the sale of a decedent's property
where the personal representative previously had no power of sale: Watson v.
Oates, 58 Ala. 647 (1877), Bruce v. Bradschaw, 69 Ala. 360 (1881), Chandler
v. Douglass, 8 Blackf. 10, 44 A. D. 732 (Ind. 1846), Williamson v. Williamson, 11 Miss. (3 Sm. & M.) 715, 41 A. D. 636 (1844), Cargile v. Fernald, 63
Mo. 304 (1876), Langdon v. Strong, 2 Vt. 234 (1829).
Contra: Rozier v.
Fagan, 46 Ill. 404 (1868).
The following cases involve the sale of a minor's property where the
guardian previously had no power of sale: Chappel v. Doe, 49 Ala. 153 (1873),
Todd v. Flournoy's Heirs, 56 Ala. 99, 28 Am. Rep. 758 (1876), Appeal of
Kneass, 31 Pa. St. 87 (1857), Appeal of Hegarty, 75 Pa. St. 503 (1874),
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613 (1880), Brenham v. Davidson, 51 Cal. 352
(1876), Mason v. Wait, 5 I1. (4 Scam.) 127 (1842) (In this case the court
laid emphasis upon the fact that the sale was expressly to be under court
supervision.), Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. 326 (1820) , Boon v. Bowers, 30
Miss. 246, 64 A. D. 159 (1855), Stewart v. Griffith, 33 Mo. 13, 82 A. D.
148 (1862), Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 32 A. D. 570 (N. Y.
1838). Contra. In re Opinion of the Court, 4 N. H. 572 (1829), Jones v.
Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yerg.) 59, 30 A. D. 430 (1836). And see supra n. 82
and 83. The following cases involve the sale of an insane person's property
where the guardian previously had no power of sale: Davidson v. Johonnot,
48 Mass. 388, 41 A. D. 448 (1844), Young v. Boardman, 97 Mo. 181, 10 S. W
48 (1888) (semble). (The act here gave the guardian of an'insane widow the
power of exercising her right of election.) In Livingston v. Moore, 32 U. S.
469 (1833) (affirming, Fed. Case No. 8,416 (1830) ) it was held that an act
giving the state a specific power of sale to satisfy a judgment in its favor was
valid. See also tnfra n. 88, 94, 102, 104.
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power of decision on law and fact (in a broad sense) is not
exclusively a judicial function. As pointed out above the executive always (consciously or unconsciously) decides questions of law and fact whenever he acts in the performance of
his duties. In enacting general legislation the legislature acts
as a result of an assumption (or a decision in that sense)
based upon past law and fact and it exercises its discretionary
86
powers of judgment as to what a proper result would be.
(It never purports, at least, to act arbitrarily ) Does it, however, specifically decide that Lot X belongs to A, as was suggested in the illustration of the special act used above? Could
not the special act be properly paraphrased to read "if Lot X
is owned by A, a minor, etc.?" In such cases is it not true
that there is only a tentative assumption of law and fact by
the legislature ?
If we assume that a tentative decision does not invade the
judicial function but that a final decision does, and if we indulge again in the usual presumption that the legislature intended a constitutional act we ought to read into such special
acts the word "if." There is nothing to indicate that the
legislature did not intend to leave the final validity of its
assumptions open to judicial inquiry It is believed that it is
a fair inference from the cases upholding special curative acts
that the courts have so dealt with the problem. In the absence of clear evidence the court ought not to assume that
the legislature actually finally decided the facts upon which a
special act is based. The sole objection then would be that
there is special or retroactive legislation interfering with
vested rights.
A goodly number of cases have been disposed of upon that
general theory In cases where the subject matter has been
litigated, resulting m a final judgment, special legislation attempting "to cure" the defects which prompted the adverse
judgment has been held unconstitutional if the legislation was
exclusively retroactive.8 7 If there had been no final judgment
86 See, State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279 (1855) for a judicial statement to
this effect.
87Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 A. R. 656 (1875), Chicago, & E. I. R.
v. People, 219 Ill. 408, 76 N. E. 571 (1905), Denny v. Mattoon, 84 Mass. 361,
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similar legislation has been held to be valid. 88 The reason
asserted is that the decision of the legislature in the first group
of cases can only be construed to be intended to be final because it attempts to deal with a situation where there has
been a final decision of a court; if it effectively supercedes the
court judgment it is the final decision, and the judgment is
not. If, however, there was no final judgment it has been
said that the decision of the legislature is solely tentative and
can be given effect, even although it be retroactive or curative.
Such reasoning sounds persuasive, but the fact of an intervening final judgment in this field has not always been held
to be controlling. If the legislation recognizes the legal validity of an intervening judgment, but imposes a liability on
the basis of equitable principles that is said to be valid. But,
of course, it changes right retroactively But the act, although
curative in effect, is said not to be retroactive in theory A
dividing line has been drawn between those acts which are
construed to deal retroactively with the subject matter of the
judgment in defiance to It 8 9 and those where it has been said
that the legislature recognizes the legal force of the judgment
but operates as to the present and future, but upon equitable
79 A. D. 784 (1861), People v. New York Central R. Co., 283 Ill. 334, 119
N. E. 299 (1918) (but see znfra n. 103), People v. Owen, 286 Ill. 638, 122
N. E. 132, 3 A. L. R. 447 (1919), People v. Wiley, 289 Ill. 173, 124 N. E.
385 (1919), People v. Clark, 300 Ill. 583, 133 N. E. 247 (1921), Reynolds v.
Brock, 122 Okla. 110, 250 P 999 (1927), Seibert v. Linton, 5 W Va. 57 (1871),
Ex Parte Low, 24 W Va. 620 (1884). See also znfra n. 89 and 103.
88 State v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 480, 143 P 112 (1914), McCord v.
Welch, 147 Ark. 362, 227 S. W 765 (1921) (in this case the court makes a
distinction between the decision of an administrative tribunal and a court,
holding that the former is not final as against subsequent legislative action),
People v. Madison, 280 I1. 96, 117 N. E. 493 (1917), People v. Stitt, 280 I1.
553, 117 N. E. 784- (1917), People v. Henry, 301 I1. 51, 133 N. E. 636 (1921),
Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. v. Streepy, 236 N. W 24 (Ia. 1931), Burr v. Beaver
Dam Drainage Dist., 145 Ark. 51, 223 S. W 362 (1920), Camp v. State, 71
Fla. 381, 72 So. 483 (1916) , People v. Peltier, 275 Ill. 217, 113 N. E. 856
(1916), Kennedy v. Meyer, 259 Pa. 306, 103 A. 44 (1918), City of Wilmington
v. Wolcott, 12 Del. Ch. 379, 112 A. 703 (1921), Smith Bros. v. Williams, 100
Fla. 642, 126 So. 367 (1930), Du Page Co. v. Jenks, 65 Ill.'275 (1872), State
v. Town of Union, 33 N. J. L. 350 (1869), Morris v. State, 62 Tex. 728 (1884),
Johnson v. County of Wells, 107 Ind. 15, 8 N. E. 1 (1886), People v. Ingham
Co., 20 Mich. 95 (1870), State v. Pool, 27 N. E. 105 (1844).
89 See supra n. 87.
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principles which circumvent it.90 The distinction is, of course,
a purely fictitious one, but it has support in our history for
equity has long exercised the power to circumvent legal judgments, explaining the while that the judgment was not being
interfered with I
The fictitious distinction, however, runs through a great
many other cases in this general field. Thus if an attempt be
made to validate void taxes or assessments some cases turn
upon the points as to whether there was an intervening judgment and if so whether or not the act in question can be construed as being in defiance of the judgment 91 or in circumvention of it upon equitable principles. 92 The latter cases say that
there is no objection to taxing for past benefits so that if the
90 Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, affirming, 45 S. D. 149, 186 N. W 867,
25 A. L. R. 1128 (1922), In re Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 612, 127
N. E. 635 (1920), Selectmen of Town of Brookline v. Boston & A. R., 236
Mass. 260, 128 N. E. 97 (1920), Steele Co. v. Erskine, 98 F 215, 39 C. C. A.
173 (U. S. C. C. A., N. D. 1899) (s. c. below, 87 F 630, (1898)), People v.
Molloy, 35 App. Div. 136, 54 N. Y. S. 1084 (1898), affd. 161 N. Y. 621, 55
N. E. 1099 (1899), Gibson v. Sherman Co., 97 Nebr. 79, 149 N. W 107 (1914),
In re Hememann's Will, 201 Wis. 484, 230 N. W 698 (1930), ch. Felix v.
Board of Com'rs. of Wallace Co., 62 Kan. 832, 62 P 667 84- A. S. R. 424
(1900) acknowledging the validity of this rule, but saying that it did not apply
because the former law actually determined all the merits of the matter.
See also znfra n. 92, 93.
91 Chicago & E. I. R. v. People, 219 Ill. 408, 76 N. E. 571 (1905), People
v. New York C. R., 283 Ill. 334, 119 N. E. 299 (1918), (cf. Worley v. Idleman, 285 Ill. 214, 120 N. E. 472 (1918) to all practical purposes, contra),
Butler v. Saginaw Co. Supers., 26 Mich. 22 (1872), Searcy v. Patriot & B.
Turnpike Co., 79 Ind. 274- (1881), City of Baltimore v. Horn, 27 Md. 194(1866), Plumer v. Marathon Co. Supers., 46 Wis. 163, 50 N. W 416 (1879),
Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59 (1874). Even although there is no intervening
judgment the curative act has been held invalid [see, Allison v. Louisville,
H. C. & W Ry., 72 Ky. 247 (1872) 1 upon the theory that the act in question
did not purport to be a tax measure, but a judicial act. See also, Forster v.
Forster, 129 Mass. 559 (1880).
Cf. Marion Co. v. Louisville & N. R., 91 Ky.
388, 15 S. W 1061 (1891), and cases cited infra n. 104, 105.
92 Nottage v. City of Portland, 35 Ore. 539, 58 P 883, 76 A. S. R. 513
(1899), Grim v. Weissenberg School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 433, 98 Am. Dec. 237
(1868), Alatalo v. Shaver, 45 S. D. 163, 186 N. W 872 (1922), Louisiana
Ry. & Nay. Co. v. State, 298 S. W 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm. v. Noel, 142 A. 634- (Md. 1928), Worley v. Idleman,
285 Il1. 214, 120 N. E. 472 (1918), Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler and Blake, 10
La. Ann. 745 (1855), Wilcox v. Miner, 201 Ia. 476, 205 N. W 847 (1925),
Doyle v. City of Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236 (1870).
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curative act creates a new tax on an equitable basis and does
not attempt to compel the collection of a past and void tax
the cases hold that the act is valid even though in terms the
act purports to be solely curative.9 3
Except, therefore, where the court has rightly or erroneously held the act to be a decision in defiance to a prior
court decision the dividing line is after all on the merits. The
question really decided has been was there an unwarranted
interference with "vested rights" ? "Vested rights" is, of
course, an illusive concept and no attempt is here made to
mark its boundaries. Its general content is well known.
Few of the cases so far cited involved legislation which
openly or directly (by express language or unescapable inference) sought to interfere directly with pending judicial pro94
ceedings or prior judgments.
Again, the first problem is one of interpretation. In those
cases where the legislation specifically deals with a single case
or judgment it is normally a fair interpretation of it that the
legislature actually intended to directly interfere with the judicial processes. Thus if a legislature seeks to grant a new trial
of a case which has finally been disposed of its action has
93 "The benefit and payment are compulsory, not matter of contract.
A
betterment already executed when the law authorizing the tax was passed
will sustain the tax as well as work built with express notice that it is
under the law." Per Holmes, J., in Hall v. Street Com'rs. of Boston, 177 Mass.
434, 59 N. E. 68 (1901). See the cases cited supra n. 92.
94 As to when a judgment becomes final is outside the scope of this article.
The following cases, however, point to some common distinctions on the point.
If an appeal has the effect of vacating a final judgment and giving a trial
de noqo a retroactive act is invalid. Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77 (Vt.
1924). If an appeal does not vacate the judgment, an act passed pending an
appeal and dealing with the substantive rights of the parties is invalid. See,
e. g., Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W 595, 62 A. S. R. 878 (1896),
Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 94- Va. 28, 26 S. E. 591 (1896). If an appeal
has vacated the judgment legislation pending the appeal may properly affect
the rights of the parties. See, e. g., People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E.
493 (1917), Sidway v. Lawson, 58 Ark. 117, 23 S. W 648 (1893). A writ of
error ordinarily does not vacate a judgment and therefore legislation passed
pending it is usually ineffective as to that case; see, e. g., People v. Clark, 300
Ill. 583, 133 N. E. 247 (1921). A judgment may well be on a condition subsequent and therefore be final while the condition is unperformed. The performance of the condition may thus be dispensed with by statute. See, Parsons
v. Parsons, 70 Colo. 154, 198 P 156 (1921).
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been held to be ineffective. 95 The only possible effect of giving
validity to such a statute is to render the judgment a nullity
The statutes do not purport to deal with substantive rights,
but purport to deal directly with the problem of judicial decision or technic. If the legislature attempts to compel an
appellate tribunal to grant a rehearing the result has been
the same. 96 A legislative pronouncement that certain judgments are void has been held to be likewise ineffective, 97 and
a legislative fiat to the effect that a void judgment is valid has
98
been held to enjoy the same fate.
95 Merrill v. Sherbourne, 1 N. H. 199 (1818) , Greenough v. Greenough, 11
Pa. St. 489, 51 A. D. 567 (1849), Petition of Siblerud, 148 Minn. 347, 182
N. W 168 (1921), In re Handley's Est., 15 Utah 212, 49 P 829, 62 A. S. R.
926 (1897), Lawson v. Jeffries, 47 Miss. 686, 12 A. R. 342 (1873) (constitutional convention), Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324 (1856), Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me.
326 (1825), Davis v. Menasha, 21 Wis. 491 (1867), Young v. State Bank,
4 Ind. 301, 58 A. D. 630 (1853), De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. St. 18,
53 A. D. 570 (1850).
But a statute granting a new trial as against the state itself is valid, for
the reason that the state may waive its immunity and consent to the vacation
of the judgment: Calkins v. State, 21 Wis. 501 (1867). Cf. Opinion of Supreme Court, 3 R. I. 299 (1854) holding that a statute could not "annul and
reverse" a judgment in favor of the state.
If the retroactive granting of an appeal or review gives a trial de noto
in the appellate court such an act is invalid. Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chip.
77 (Vt. 1824), Williams v. New York, N. H. & H. R., 71 Conn. 43, 40 A.
925 (1898). And see also, infra n. 119-122.
An early Pennsylvania Case, Braddee v. Brownfield, 2 Watts & S. 271 (1841)
contrary to the principal proposition has been overruled. See, Greenough v.
Greenough, supra.
The federal Constitution does not of course have any bearing on the question from this angle, and does not prevent the granting of a new trial by a
legislature: Calder v. Bull, 3 U. S. 386 (1798).
96
Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238 (1863), Dorsey
v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64, 11 A. R. 528 (1872), Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill. 147 (Md.
1844).
97 McNealy v. Gregory, 13 Fla. 417 (1870) (the fiat here was by a constitutional convention, but it was dealt with on the same basis as a legislativejudicial controversy).
98 Israel v. Arthur, 7 Colo. 5, 1 P 438 (1883), Roche v. Waters, 72 Md.
264, 19 A. 535, 7 L. R. A. 533 (1890), Denny v. Mattoon, 84 Mass. 361, 79
A. D. 784 (1861), Richards v. Rote, 68 Pa. St. 248 (1871).
The legislature may cure formal defects which did not affect the validity
of the judgment, such, C. g., as the signing of the record by the judge. See,
Cookerly v. Duncan, 87 Ind. 332 (1882).
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There is said to be, however, a valid distinction in this
connection between some decrees in equity and the usual final
judgment at law; that even a final decree in equity enjoining
action by the defendant is subject to later modification in the
light of new circumstances, either fact or law A legislature
may thus indirectly avoid a final decree enjoining action as
unlawful by making the conduct unlawful. 99 The defendant
may thus move to dissolve or modify the injunction on the
basis of the new substantive law involved. On the other hand
if a final legal judgment is involved a legislative attempt to
pronounce new law and to give the losing party a right to
vacate the judgment is said to be the equivalent of a direct
act granting a new trial by the legislature and is invalid. 00
For the same reason a decree in equity which finally fixes the
rights of parties in trust property, for example, has been held
to be on a parity with a final judgment at law 101
It has also been held that if a final judgment is already
subject to direct or collateral attack, upon the grounds of mistake, fraud, surprise or similar situations, and a legislative act
simply codifies the existing rules on the subject there is no
objection to it, even although it is given retroactive effect. 10 2
Such rules are after all limitations on the original concept of
the finality of judgments and there is no objection to a legislative codification of them.
But legislation which attempts directly to vacate (by the
retroactive allowance of an appeal, for example) or to modify
a judgment or substantially change its legal effect as a judgment has rather uniformly been held invalid. 1

3

Nor can

99 The State v. Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18
How. 421 (U. S. 1855), Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239, 49 A. R. 27 (1884).
100 Sanders v. Cabaniss, .43 Ala. 173 (1869).
In the case in 18 How. 421
cited immediately above it was agreed that legislation could not affect the
judgment for costs.
101 Berrett v. Oliver, 7 Gill. & J. 191 (Md. 1835).

102 Colvert v. Williams, 10 Ind. 478 (1857).
103 Ratcliffe v. Anderson, 31 Grat. 105, 31 A. R. 716 (Va. 1878) (act here
changed the medium of exchange in which the judgment was payable), Marpole v. Cather, 78 Va. 239 (1833) (the same act was held ineffective as to
a subsequent judgment, which is obviously erroneous, except as against the
contract clause in the federal Constitution), In re Handley's Est., 15 Utah,
212, 49 P 829, 62 A. S. R. 926 (1897), State v. Wildes, 34 Nev. 94, 116 P
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the legislature render the improper record entry of a judgment conclusive, as against the court's power to correct its
records by an order nunc pro tunc. 10 4 The case last cited is
in keeping with the general rule that the judgment of a court
is the pronouncement by the court, and that the record is
simply evidence of it. To make the record conclusive would
thus contradict the real judgment rendered. If, however,
the original judgment was not on the merits a statute permitting another action is simply a codification of a common
law rule on the subject and is valid. 10 5 And if the judgment
has not become final a review of it may be specifically provided for.10 6
Another large group of cases involves the validity of legislative action dealing directly with pending litigation.
One proposition seems reasonably well settled. If a state
interest is involved legislation which in terms appears to be
an interference with judicial processes cannot well be so construed. The state has the same power over its interests and
litigation as has an individual and there is nothing to prevent
it at any time from releasing, compromising or abandoning
those interests or dismissing its litigation (apart from the
Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments)
That rather obvious result has been reached in some cases.
Thus it has been held that the legislature may abate or dismiss an action brought by a revenue agent for a violation
595 (1911), Prout v. Berry, 2 Gill. 147 (Md. 1844), Miller v. State, 8 Gill.
145 (Md. 1849), Appeal of Bagg's, 43 Pa. St. 512, 82 A. D. 583 (1862),
Staniford v. Barry, 1 Aikens 314, 15 A. D. 691 (Vt. 1825), Carleton v. Goodwin, 41 Ala. 153 (1867), Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824), Yeatman v. Day, 79 Ky. 186 (1880), Lanier v. Gallatas, 13 La. Ann. 175 (1858).
Contra: Appeal of Wheeler, 45 Conn. 306 (1877).
If a retroactive appeal is allowed as against the state that is valid, for
clearly the state may waive its immunity. State v. Dexter, 10 R. I. 341
(1872). Cf. Opinion of Supreme Court, 3 R. I. 299 (1854), holding that the
state may not "annul and reverse" a judgment in its favor.
If constitutional provision is made for the vacation of previous judgments
that is a valid limitation on the doctrine of the separation of powers, although
due process of law requires notice and hearing on the petition to vacate. See,
Peerce v. Kitzmiller, 19 W Va. 564- (1882).
104 Nevitt v. Wilson, 116 Tex. 29, 285 S. W 1079 (1926).
105 West Buffalo v. Walker Twp., 8 Pa. St. 177 (1848).
106 State v. Northern Central Ry., 18 Md. 193 (1861).
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of the state anti-trust laws ;107 that the legislature may determine and allow the amount of a claim against it or one
of its political subdivisions. 10 8 In a few cases the action has
been sustained on the theory that the determination of the
amount was tentative solely, 10 9 or that the act in question
removed a procedural bar to an otherwise valid action. 110
A state may release its property interests and thus an act
validating a void will, where if the will were invalid the state
would take the testator's property by escheat, has been held
valid.'
On the other hand a statute which attempted to substitute
one state officer for another in a pending action brought by
the state was held to be invalid,1 2 and an act dismissing an
113
action brought by county officers was said to be ineffective.
The courts in those cases apparently thought that the statute
properly construed was intended to operate as against the
court rather than as against the officers involved. Construed
in the latter light, however, the statutes were certainly
inoffensive.
Some few cases have decided that the legislature may not
settle, determine, or release a claim against or in favor of
the state, 114 and the New York court has held that after
Miller v. Globe-Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 143 Miss. 489, 108 So. 180
Cf. the Mississippi cases cited znfra n. 128.
108 McLaughlin v. Charleston Co. Com'rs, 7 S. C. 375 (1876), Tallassee
Mfg. Co. v. Glenn, 50 Ala. 489 (1874), Commonwealth v. Ferries Co., 120
Va. 827, 92 S. E. 804- (1917), Carolina Glass Co. v. State, 87 S. C. 270, 69
S. E. 391 (1910), In re Constitutionality of Subs. Sen. Bill No. 83, 21 Colo. 69,
39 P 1088 (1895). Cf. the cases cited infra n. 114.
109 Shaw v. Dennis, 10 Ill. 405 (1849),
Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477
(1854), State v. Henry Co. Com'rs, 41 Oh. St. 423 (1884).
110 Gibson v. Sherman Co., 97 Nebr. 79, 149 N. W 107 (1914).
111 In re Sticknoth, 7 Npv. 223 (1872).
112 Miller v. Hay, 143 Miss. 471, 109 So. 16 (1926) , Miller v. Johnston,
143 Miss. 686, 109 So. 715 (1926). Cf. the Mississippi case cited supra n. 123.
113 McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Ia. 163, 118 N. W 415, 132 A. S. R. 248
(1908).
114 State v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 439 (1878),
Roberts v. State, 30 App. Div.
106, 51 N. Y. S. 691 (1898) affd. 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899) , Com'rs
of Queen Anne's Co. v. Com'rs of Talbot Co., 108 N. D. 188, 69 A. 801 (1908),
Hardy v. Branch Bk., 15 Ala. 722 (1849), Allison v. Louisville, H. C. & W
Ry., 72 Ky. 247 (1873), City of Wellington v. Wellington Twp., 46 Kan.
213, 26 P 415 (1891), Columbus, C. & I. R. W v. Grant Co. Com'rs, 65 Ind.
107

(1926).
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the establishment of a Court of Claims the legislature could
not so act.1 15 It has even been held that the legislature may
not order the abatement of pending criminal cases. 16
In any event the legislative determination of a claim against
the state does not preclude a judicial review on constitutional
grounds, other than the separation of powers. 17
The fact that the state is a party to the action does not,
as against the other party, add to the legislature's power to
Thus the
adversely affect the interests of such a party
legislature may not finally determine the amount of a claim
owing to the state;11s nor foreclose a mortgage in favor of
20
the state;119 nor construe a contract in its favor.
For the same reason it has been held that the legislature
may not finally decide the facts and law as between private
persons. Thus it may not finally determine the rights as
between two adverse claimants to the salary of a state
office ;121 that an estate was indebted in a certain amount ;122
that a mortgage should be foreclosed ;123 that one of several
claimants was the owner of certain real estate ;124 that one
(1879).
Some of those decisions rest upon the basis that a tax payer has
interests which are protected. But that is substance, not jurisdiction. Cf.
cases cited supra n. 108.
115 Brown v. State, 236 N. Y. 611, 142 N. E. 304 (1923) affg. 206 App.
Div. 634, 198 N. Y. S. 773 (1923), Mendelson v. State, 136 Misc. Rep. 242,
240 N. Y. S. 673 (1930). In the Mendelson case and the Roberts case (supra
n. 130) there was an intervening final judgment; but it is difficult to see
how this has any real effect. In those cases, however, the court did construe
the statute in question as having been intended to directly contradict the
judgment.
116 State v. Sloss, 25 Mo. 291, 69 A. D. 467 (1857) , State v. Fleming, 26
Tenn. 152, 46 A. D. 73 (1846).
117 Board of Education v. State, 51 Oh. St. 531, 38 N. E. 614, 46 A. S. R.
588 (1894). In this case the court held that the allowance of a claim based
upon mistake was open to judicial inquiry on the fact of mistake, because
otherwise there would be taxation for something other than a public purpose.
For a somewhat similar case see, Craft v. Lofinck, 34 Kan. 365, 8 P 359 (1885).
118 Carolina Glass Co. v. State, 87 S. C. 270, 29 S. E. 391 (1910), United
States v. Peters, 9 U. S. 115 (1809).
119Perry v. Clinton R., 11 Rob. 404, 412 (La. 1845).
120 Commonwealth v. New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339 (1854).
121 State v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44-, 28 N. E. 88 (1891).
122Lane v. Doe, 4 Il. 238, 36 A. D. 543 (1841).
123 Ashuelot R. R. v. Elliot, 58 N. H. 451 (1878).
124 Jackson v. Frost, 5 Cow. 346 (N. Y. 1826).
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of two parents was entitled to the custody of a minor child;125
that certain trustees of a college were incompetent to hold
office.1 26 It may not directly abate pending actions. 127 In
most of those cases it probably can fairly be said that the
legislature was speaking in terms of judgments and not substantive rights.
But some legislation which in terms appears to be a decision by the legislature as to the final rights of private parties
in pending litigation has been quite properly construed to be
simply a tentative decision and to leave to the parties recourse to the courts, 1 2 although an opposite interpretation
has been given in a few cases. 129 Even although the lan-

guage of the statute simply purports to give a party the privilege of bringing an action it has been held that it was invalid. 5 0 In these latter cases the legislature, although it
spoke in terms of procedure, was probably attempting to
create in the plaintiff a substantive right which he properly
had not owned before. The real objection was that the
125 Tillman v. Tillman, 84- S. C. 552, 66 S. E. 1049, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
781 (1019).
126 State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570 (1869).
The case of Tindal v. Drake, 60
Ala. 170 (1877) involving a private trust is contra in effect.
127 People v. Madison, 280 Ill. 96, 117 N. E. 493 (1917) , People v. Wiley,
284 Ill. 186, 119 N. E. 965 (1917), Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 217
App. Div. 67, 216 N. Y. S. 215 (1926). Presumably it could (as against this
objection) change the law of procedure or jurisdiction, which, if the point
were raised by one of the parties, would reach that result. Although there
would then be presented a question under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
difficulty in the principal cases was that the statute purported to itself operate
to abate the actions.
128 Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369 (1847), Watkins v. Holman,
16 Pet. 25 (1842), Providence, F R. & N. S. Co. v. City of Fall River, 183
Mass. 535, 67 N. E. 647 (1903), In re City of Northampton, 158 Mass. 299,
33 N. E. 568 (1893), Ex parte Picquet, 22 Mass. 65 (1827), Hindman v. Piper,
50 Mo. 292 (1872).
129 Bridgeport Public Library v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 82 A. 582
(1912), Roche v. Waters, 72 Md. 264, 19 A. 535, 7 L. R. A. 533 (1890).
In
the latter case the court laid some emphasis upon the fact that there was an
intervening final judgment, but because of a total lack of service of process
there was in truth no judgment.
130 Pittsburgh & S. R. v. Gazzam, 32 Pa. St. 340 (1858) , Tate v. Bell, 12
Tenn. 202, 26 A. D. 221 (1833).
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legislation interfered with vested rights for the statutes in
no sense purported to be judgments. 13 1
A statute which is openly substantive in form but which is
expressly applied to pending actions has been held not to be
invalid. 1 32 The case cited involved a statute which reduced

a statutory penalty It was in terms legislative and had it
been otherwise it should have been so construed. But in one
case the Missouri court has construed language which is
clearly not in the form of a judgment to constitute an at3
tempted judgment nevertheless.1 8

For what some courts thought were good historical reasons a number of cases have held that a legislature had the
power to grant a divorce. 1 34 After general divorce statutes

were passed it seems to have been conceded that the legislature was thus deprived of jurisdiction to grant divorces
for any cause stated in the general statutes, although it was
still held that a legislative divorce for another cause was
valid. 135 The practice is today either expressly forbidden
131 Cf. Board of Education v. Bakewell, 122 II. 339, 10 N. E. 378 (1887)
involving a somewhat similar problem where the emphasis is properly laid
on the due process clause.
132 Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 62 A. 616 (1905).
133 State v. Gordon, 236 Mo. 14-2, 139 S. W 403 (1911).
In this case
the statute appropriated money for the Fish and Game Department but provided that none of it was to be paid out while the plaintiff continued as commissioner. It was held that the act constituted a final decision by the legislature that the commissioner was unfit, and was for that reason invalid! The
court also held that the act interfered with the governor's exclusive power to
remove officers of this character, which, of course, would have been a satisfactory ground for decision.
134 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888) affg. 2 Wash. T. 321, 5 P 717
(1884), Crane v. Meginnis, 1 Gill & J. 463, 19 Am. Dec. 237 (Md. 1829)
(in this case the court held that a legislative divorce was valid, but a legislative grant of alimony was invalid), Wright v. Wright's Lessee, 2 Md. 429,
56 A. D. 723 (1852), Bingham v. Miller, 17 Oh. 445, 49 A. D. 471 (1848)
(this is one of the most curious cases in the books, for in it the court said
that the legislature had no power to grant a divorce, but it upheld it because
the legislature had in fact done it!) , Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (1857) (dictum), Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541 (1831), Cabell v. Cabell's Adin., 58 Ky.
319 (1858) (c. Kentucky cases cited infra n. 153), Mitchell v. Mitchell, 63
Misc. Rep. 580, 117 N. Y. S. 671 (1909) (dictum).
135 Levins v. Sleator, 2 G. Greene, 604 (Ia. 1850), In re Justices Opinion,
16 Me. 479 (1840), Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863), Jones v. Jones,
12 Pa. St. 350, 51 A. D. 611 (1849), Roberts v. Roberts, 54 Pa. St. 265 (1867),
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by constitutional limitation or the usual constitutional provision against the enactment of special laws.1 3 6 In any event
there was always a respectable amount of authority holding
legislative divorces invalid.13 7 The cases upholding them
were rested upon the proposition that Parliament and the
Colonial and early state legislatures had always granted divorces. s88 The same reasoning would uphold the granting
of new trials and numerous other exercises of judicial power
by the legislature, but in other instances the proposition has
been effectively repudiated. 3 9
Upon much the same basis there has been some discussion
in the cases as to whether or not the legislature had the power
to declare a forfeiture of a corporate or other grant. Originally the practice certainly permitted it. However, as against
the objection that a legislative forfeiture constituted an invasion of the judicial function the cases seem quite uniformly
to condemn the practice.1 40
If in the original grant the
legislature reserved the unlimited right of amendment and
repeal action under the reservation has been held to be not
Cromse v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255 (1867) (the Pennsylvania cases were influenced by a constitutional provision which seemed specifically to sanction
the practice).
Wright v. Wright's Lessee, supra n. 150, repudiates the distinction saying that a legislative divorce was valid regardless of a general
statute.
136Teft v. Teft, 3 Mich. 67 (1853), Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37 (1857),
Winkles v. Powell, 173 Ala. 46, 55 go. 536 (1911), DeVulst v. DeVuist, 228
Mich. 454, 199 N. W 229 (1924), Sparhawk v. Sparhawk, 116 Mass. 315
(1874), White v. White, 105 Mass. 325, 7 A. R. 526 (1870).
137 Bryson v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 498 (1849), Bryson v. Bryson, 17 Mo. 590
(1853), Chouteau v. Magenis, 28 Mo. 187 (1859), Bryson v. Bryson, 44 Mo.
232 (1869), Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23 (1851), Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H.
380 (1839) (dictum), Berthelemy v. Johnson, 42 Ky. 90, 38 A. D. 179 (1842)
(dictum), Gaines v. Gaines, 48 Ky. 295, 48 A. D. 425 (1848) (but cf. Kentucky case cited supra n. 150).
138 See in particular, Maynard v. Hill, supra n. 150.
139 See in particular, Merrill v. Sherbourne, 1 N. H. 199 (1818) and supra
n. 111, also, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
140 In re Opinion of Justices, 237 Mass. 619, 131 N. E. 29 (1921), Manning
v. Rama Rural Comm., 182 N. C. 861, 109 S. E. 576 (1921), Bruffett v. Great
W R., 25 Il. 310 (1861) (dictum), American Printing House v. Dupuy,
37 La. Ann. 188 (1885), Regents of U. of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365,
31 A. D. 72 (Md. 1838), State v. Burgess, 23 La. Ann. 225 (1871), Flint
& F Plank Rd. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 12 A. R. 233 (1872).
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judicial but legislative. 141 In some cases the courts have read
into such a reservation the restriction that the power shall
be exercised in good faith so that there may be a judicial
review on that question. 142 In other cases the reservation
has been expressly limited to cases of "misuse" or "abuse"
and the cases concede a judicial review on those facts.' 4 3 A
forfeiture statute is today, and obviously should be, construed
as impliedly granting a judicial review on the facts as to the
14 4
forfeiture and their legal effect.
The question has also been presented as to whether legislation which takes away an available defense and is in terms
applicable to pending litigation and past transactions invades
the judicial function. It has been decided that an act completely taking away a defense is valid, because it is said the
defendant has no vested interests in the defense.145 That
such an act effectively increases the defendant's legal obliga141 Wagner Free Inst. v. City of Philadelphia, 132 Pa. St. 612, 19 A. 297
(1890), Morris & Essex R. v. Miller, 30 N. J. L. 368 (1863), 31 N. J. L. 521
(1864), American Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 46 Md. 15 (1877),
Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253 (1851), Lothrop v. Stedman, Fed. Case No. 8519
(1875).
In the absence of such a reservation there may well be a violation of the
clause against the impairment of contract obligations. See, e. g., State v.
Noyes, 47 Me. 189 (1859) and cases there cited.
142 Miners' Bank v. United States, 1 Morris 482, 43 A. D. 115 (Ga. 1846),
2d. 1 G. Greene 553 (1848), Crease v. Babcock, 40 Mass. 334, 34 A. D. 61
(1839).
143 Myrick v. La Moure, 33 Minn. 377, 23 N. W 549 (1885),
Erie &
N. E. R. v. Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287 (1856), Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh &
C. R., 58 Pa. St. 26 (1868).
In Flint & F Plank Rd. Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99, 12 A. R. 233 (1872)
it was held that the judicial determination of the fact of "abuse" had to
precede the legislative action.
The court in American Printing House v. Dupuy, 37 La. Ann. 188 (1885)
construed such a charter as a limitation on the corporate powers and not a
reservation of power to the legislator, and thus reached the result that legislative action was absolutely ineffective.
144 Hawley v. Bonanza Queen Mining Co., 61 Wash. 90, 111 P 1073
(1910), Cox v. Gretna Academy, 141 La. 1001, 76 So. 177 (1917), People
ex rel v. Rose, 207 Ill. 352, 69 N. E. 762 (1904).
145 Iowa Saving & Loan Ass'n v. Selby, 111 Ia. 402, 82 N. W 968 (1900)
(defense of usury), Brown v. Boston & M. R., 233 Mass. 502, 124 N. E. 322
(1919) (defense of ultra vires). Contra: Lindsay v. United States Savings &
Loan Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24- So. 171, 42 L. R. A. 783 (1898).
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tions as a practical matter is plain. The courts have justified
the result by asserting that his obligations were unchanged,
the defense of usury (for example) being a procedural privilege and not a substantive one. 146 The distinction is, as a
matter of theory, a possible one, although as a practical matter it does violence to the actualities of the situation and it
seems based on no obvious policy calling for that result. It
may be fairly said to be the result of a confusion as to the
proper dividing line between substance and procedure. The
cases seem to assume that because it is a "defense" it is necessarily solely a procedural concept. But as has been pointed
out above procedure and substance are often stated in terms
of each other and are usually co-extensive. Stating that certain matter is a "defense" means after all that it is a "defense" procedurally and substantially and while the legislature may effectively deal with the first aspect of it without
violating vested interests 147 it cannot do so as to the second
aspect of it.
Despite the rather imposing array of cases condemning
curative legislation as an invasion of the judicial function
there is considerable agreement that certain types of curative
legislation are valid. Thus it has been held that the legislature may by special' 48 or general act 4 9 provide for the sale
of trust property, of the land of a decedent, or of a minor
or an insane person. Such acts create in the trustee, the administrator or guardian a power of sale over the property
which he previously did not have, and therefore create new
140 See supra n. 106.
147 That is, it might place the burden of pleading on the subject of usuary
on the plaintiff rather than the defendant, or it might make the fact in issue
under an answer in general denial. In determining substantive legal interests
procedure has no bearing on the subject. If a usurious transaction in void or
voidable the substantive rights of the parties are determined by those concepts and it makes no difference whether we make the fact of "usury" a
defense procedurally, or compel the plaintiff to negative the fact in order to
make out a prima facie case. If the act does deal with the procedural aspect
of the problem and leaves the substantive rights of the parties unimpaired it
is clearly valid. See, e. g., Downey v. People, 205 Ill. 230, 68 N. E. 807 (1903).
148 See supra n. 85.

149 Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939, 11 So. 111, 30 A.
S. R. S99 (1892).
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legal interests which are at odds with the vested interests previously existing. In that sense they are retroactive. That
such is the legal result is evidenced by the cases holding that
if the owner of the property in question is suz juris such an
act is invalid. 5 0 Thus also a statute of limitations affecting
title to land cannot be changed retroactively, 51 and a statute
provided for additional compensation retroactively under a
52
workmen's compensation act has been held invalid.
But acts curing void land sales by a foreign executor have
been upheld. 53 A void sale by partition has been successfully cured, 5 4 and an act providing that if land were sold
under void proceedings for sale the legal owner could not
recover possession until he had refunded the money received
from the void sale has been upheld. 55 Deeds and bonds void
because of defective acknowledgment have been cured.3 6
If the question arises as against the state or one of its
political subdivisions curative legislation is almost uniformly
held to be valid. 57 The postulate of such cases is that the
150 Cluskey v. Burns, 120 Mo. 567, 25 S. W 585 (1893), Appeal of Ervine,
16 Pa. St. (4 Harris) 256, 55 Am. Dec. 499 (1851), Saxton v. Mitchell, 78
Pa. St. 479 (1875), Appeal of Kneass, 31 Pa. St. 87 (1857), Appeal of Hegarty,
75 Pa. St. 503 (1874). Contra: Linsley v. Hubbard, 44 Conn. 109, 26 A. R.
431 (1876), Edwards v. Pope, 4 I1. (3 Scam.) 465 (1842).
151 Arrowsmith v. Burlingin, Fed. Cas. No. 563, 4 McLean 489 (1848).
152 Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151 A.
518 (1930).
'53 Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 627 (1829), Watkins v. Holman, 41 U. S.
25 (1842).
154 Kearney v. Taylor, 56 U. S. 494 (1853).
155 Claypoole v. King, 21 Kan. 434 (1879).
156 Steger v. Traveling Men's Bldg. & Loan Co., 208 I1. 236, 70 N. E. 236,
100 A. S. R. 225 (1904), Sidway v. Lawson, 58 Ark. 117, 23 S. W 648 (1893),
Chestnut v. Shane's Lessee, 16 Ohio 599, 47 A. D. 387 (1847), State v. Pool,
27 N. C. 105 (1844-).
157 If an individual brings the action it has been disposed of upon the
ground that the plaintiff is not "legally interested." See, e. g., In re Farnum's
Petition, 51 N. H. 367 (1871), Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, affirming,
45 S. D. 149, 186 N. W 867, 25 A. L. R. 1128 (1922). Cf. Dissenting opinion
of Treanor, j., in Bolivar Tp. Board v. Hawkins, - Ind. -, 191 N. E. 158
(1934).
If the municipal corporation objects the answer has been that the state
may make such disposition of its own legal interests as it sees fit, for after
all the former is a part of the latter. See, e. g., Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530
(1860), City of San Francisco v. Beideman, 17 Cal. 443 (1861), Nolan County
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political subdivision is subject to the discipline of the state
and the latter, for the former, may forego or modify any of
its legal interests. In the language of "vested interests" the
municipal corporation has none as against the state. That
such action may in a given case increase the taxation of inhabitants of the subdivision involved has been said for the
same general reason to be unavailing. The. state has the
right to increase taxation, directly or indirectly
(But not
unreasonably, and not for a purpose which is not a public purpose. On this latter score a great many of these cases may
be questioned.)
The foregoing review of the cases on interpretative and
curative legislation discloses a very considerable confusion
on the subject. But it is apparent that in final analysis the
foundation of the difficulty in this field is the retroactive character of the legislation involved.
The objection that the curative act is an invasion of the
judicial function because it is retroactive and interferes with
"vested rights" is rather clearly of an unsubstantial character. Originally (in the absence of constitutional limitations) there was nothing to prevent a legislature from enacting that "A's property shall hereafter belong to B." Even
today, under the due process clause, there is high authority for
the proposition that property may be taken (by regulation)
if the taking does not go too far. 158
v. State, 83 Tex. 182, 17 S. W 823 (1891), McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Ia.
163, 118 N. W 415, 132 A. S. R. 248 (1908), Ware v. City of Fitchburg, 200
Mass. 61, 85 N. E. 951 (1908), Schneck v. City of Jeffersonville, 152 Ind.
204-, 52 N. E. 212 (1898), People v. Molloy, 35 App. Div. 136, 54 N. Y. S.
1084 (1898), affd. 161 N. Y. 621, 55 N. E. 1099 (1899), Town of Guilford v.
Cornell, 18 Barb. 615 (N. Y. 1854), Williams v. New York, N. H. & H. R., 71
Conn. 43, 40 A. 925 (1898), State v. Boards of Com'rs, 86 Mont. 595, 285
P 932 (1930), Burns v. Clariin Co., 62 Pa. St. 422 (1869), Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 15 (1874), contra: Felix v. Board of Com'rs of Wallace
Co., 62 Kan. 832, 62 P 667, 84 A. S. R. 424 (1900), Union School Dist.
v. Foster Lbr. Co., 142 Okla. 260, 286 P 774 (1930), Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153 (1880), Bolivar Tp. Board v. Hawkins, - Ind. -, 191
N. E. 158 (1934).
158 Mr. Justice Holmes' opinions are replete with the substance of proposition. See, Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution in the volume
"Mr. Justice Holmes," pp. 46-118 (1931). This is the substance of the opinion
in the Gold Clause cases.
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It is, of course, true that "property" and "vested interests" are legal concepts and that the final test of their legal
value is the extent of their judicial recognition (directly or
Judge Comstock is authority for the statement
indirectly)
that "that is property which the courts recognize as property" 159 and nothing any more definite than that can be said.
The dividing line between those rights which are "vested"
and which may not be disturbed retroactively to the extent
proposed in a given case and those which are not "vested"
and which may be in some measure disturbed is at best indistinct before it is actually drawn. But there seems to be no
reason why a statute which changes the rules of property law,
even retroactively, should be said to constitute an invasion
of the judicial function. At least if the objection is the retroactive character of the legislation the cases here cannot logically enter into an inquiry as to its substantive effect, sustaining
some legislation and condemning another. Presumably the
test of jurisdiction in this connection is the character of the
act to be performed not its quality nor its merits. As has
been suggested above a sane result can be reached under the
due process clauses. In this field the courts anticipated the
Fourteenth Amendment. They condemned retroactive legislation and gave as the best reason available the doctrine of the
separation of powers.
If the situation is complicated by an intervening judgment
that fact alone would seem to be inconclusive. A judgment
is evidence of a legal interest which a court has declared
existed. It is a "vested" interest of the better sort, where
the possibility of its successful contradiction is foreclosed.
But is it ipso facto beyond legislative control? There is much
authority for the proposition that it may be regulated, or even
ignored, that is, "circumvented." Again, however, why may
not the legislature change the law of property or persons
159 "It is a simple and intelligible proposition, admitting, in the nature of
the case, of no qualification, that that is property which the law of the land
recognizes as such." Per Comstock, J., in Wynehamer v. the People, 13 N. Y. 378,
385 (1856). Cf. Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. 19, 37 L. R. A.
294, 62 A. S. R. 477 (1897) where the court sustained an act prohibiting the
wasteful burning of natural gas, because the defendant's asserted right was
a "natural" and not a "legal" one.
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retroactively and say in effect that the plaintiff's right evidenced by a judgment is modified, or even abrogated completely? True such action defies the judgment, but may not
the legislature change the law evidenced by a judgment?
There is substantial authority for the proposition that it may
if its action is justifiable. It may, for example, declare a
bridge to be a lawful structure, which a court had declared
to be an unlawful structure.1 60 But it may not abrogate the
duty to pay a money judgment. 6
Again, if the problem is
one of jurisdiction the character of the act and not its quality
should determime it. Thus there is an inconsistency in those
cases if they are decided under the doctrine of the separation
of powers, but no inconsistency if they be decided under the
Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments.
In those cases where the objection has been made that the
legislature has decided a case, or has directly interfered with
its decision there is some substance to sustain the results. It
seems reasonably clear that the final decision of disputed questions of "existing" law and past fact is a judicial and not a
legislative function. Thus if the legislative action in question
is really an attempt to finally decide on the merits an existing
controversy, or to substitute its judgment (as such) for that
of a court, it may quite properly be said that the legislative
has got over into the judicial field. It does seem apparent,
however, that the courts have been somewhat hasty in ascribing to the legislature an intention to interfere. A great many
courts could well have held that the legislative action constituted at most a tentative assumption as to law and fact rather
than a final decision on either. Too, if it be fairly determined
that the decision was final it may well be a fair interpretation
that it was not an attempt to decide the controversy in question on past facts and law, but that it was an arbitrary declaration of a retroactive rule for the occasion.
One is impressed with the fact in this field that as a practical matter the courts have frequently themselves overstepped
the bounds of the doctrine of the separation of powers and
160 The State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
18 How. 421 (U. S. 1855).
161 Ibid.
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have substituted their ideas for those of the legislature. They
have forgotten that arbitrary law is none the less law and that
while legislative action is in one sense a judgment or decision
it is not therefore a judgment or decision in the same sense
that final court action is a judgment or decision. When it is
then the legislature is out of bounds, but until it is the legislature is simply announcing rules and they are none the less
valid because they purport to be on meritorious grounds.
V
It seems very apparent that a legislative investigation is not
the exercise of a judicial function. Confusion has arisen here
because of the employment of the non-sequitur that because
a court investigates facts that therefore the investigation of
facts is exclusively a judicial function.
Some earlier cases, however, rather broadly asserted that
legislative investigation constituted ipso facto an invasion of
the judicial function..1 62 This has been quite effectively repudiated, but only within limits. It is now stated that a legislative body has power to investigate facts if there is a bona
fide purpose to legislative, rather than simply investigate. 63
In the Sinclaircase the Supreme Court asserted that the investigation was valid because it was not into the witnesses' private affairs." This obviously constitutes a new classification
of affairs "private and not private."
Stating the result in those terms is clearly a possible view
However it brings again into the concept of judicial and legislative jurisdiction an incongruity The concept of power or
jurisdiction is here one which presumably is capable of being
162 The leading cases are Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880) and
In re Pacific Ry. Comm., 32 Fed. 241 (1887). But the legislature decided
nothing, except that it wants to hear the witness in question, and inferentially
that it has the power to want to hear him.
163 McGram v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319 (1927) reversing
299 F 620; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 (1929), Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 P 725 (1929), Greenfield v. Russell, 292 Il1. 392,
127 N. E. 102, 9 A. L. R. 1334 (1920). The other state cases, which seem
to be rather consistently in accord, are cited in Ex parte Daugherty. The
cases cited in n. 161 were "reconciled" on the theory that the record affirmatively disclosed a lack of good faith.
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stated in terms of the character or kind of act to be done
rather than the substantive quality of it. It is suggested that
those cases likewise could much better be decided under the
due process clauses, in other words-that the legislative action
is valid or invalid depending upon the reasonableness of the
interference with the liberty of the particular witness. 64 That
in turn depends upon the social utility of the proposed action,
which would call into question the actual purposes and good
faith of the legislative body
By specific constitutional provision impeachment of various
public officials is committed to legislative bodies, and there
is thus a specific exception to the general rule. It seems to
have been decided in Louisiana, however, that impeachment,
even although it be assumed to be a judicial function can be
controlled by the legislature without reference to a constitutional reservation on the point. 65
It was held in an early case that the trial of a treason case
was within the legislative powers. 166
Although there is some dissent on the proposition the vast
majority of cases reach the result that legislation on the subject of contempt invades the judicial function. 167 Some cases
164 As a formal matter this would leave the jurisdictional dividing line
between the judicial and legislative functions one which is clear cut and in
keeping with the basic distinctions involved.
165 State v. Ramos-Baldwin, 10 La. Ann. 420 (1855), State v. Orleans
Civil Dist. Judges, 35 La. Ann. 1075 (1883).
166 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U. S. 14 (1800). The case seems to be at variance
with the usual procedure. See, Bishop, Criminal Law, Sec. -608-625 (9th ed.
1923).
167 State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 623 (1927) (dictum), Walton Lunch Co.
v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429 (1920) (jury trial), Guiraud v.
Nevada C. Co., 79 Colo. 289, 245 P 485 (1926) (change of venue), Fort v.
Cooperative Farmers' Exch., 81 Colo. 431, 256 P 319 (1927) (jury trial) , In
re Atchison, 284 F 604 (D. C. Fla. 1922) (jury trial. But cf. Michaelson v.
United States infra n. 162), Pacific Line S. Co. v. Ellison R. Co., 46 Nev.
351, 213 P 700 (1923) (jury trial), Underhill v. Schenck, 205 App. Div. 182,
199 N. Y. S. 611 (1923), Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170,
118 S. W 86, 16 Ann. Cas. 749 (1909) (Cf. Ex parte Creasy infra), Smith v.
Speed, 11 Okla. 95, 66 P 511, 55 L. R. A. 402 (1901), Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780, 45 L. R. A. 310 (1899), Bryan v. State, 99
Ark. 163, 137 S. W 561, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 908 (1911), Ex parte McCown,
139 N. C. 95, 51 S. E. 957, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 603 (1905), Hale v. Sate, 55
Oh. St. 210, 45 N. E. 199, 36 L. R_ A. 254, 60 A. S. R. 691 (1896) (overruling
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have evaded the question by interpreting legislation on the
subject as prescribing minimum standards or as being inapplicable and therefore as not prohibiting a common law contempt.

168

The general proposition seems to be at variance with the
basic distinctions involved. Legislation on the subject might
well be directed at substance, procedure or jurisdiction in the
field of contempt. Most of it can only fairly be interpreted
to fall within the first two classifications. That is, the usual
legislation on the subject prescribes the rules of conduct of
individuals in their relationship with the court, the measure
of punishment, or the mode of ascertaining a violation of the
rules. 6 9 That is equally true whether the subject matter is
criminal or civil contempt, so called. If the legislation is in
terms of jurisdiction, that is, it specifically or impliedly leaves
the substantive rules of conduct intact but limits the jurisdicearlier Ohio cases), Bradley v. State, II Ga. 168, 36 S. E. 630, 50 L. R. A.
691 (1900), Ford v. State, 69 Ark. 550, 64 S. W 879 (1901), In re Shortridge,
99 Cal. 526, 34 P 227, 37 A. S. R. 78 (1893), State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384
(1855), Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338, 46 A. R. 224 (1886), Holman v. State,
105 Ind, 513, 5 N. E. 556 (1885).
Spight v. State, 155 Ark. 26, 243 S. W 860 (1922) turns upon a specific
constitutional provision on the subject.
State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W 79, 99 A. S. R. 624 (1903) contains
the most exhaustive discussion of the subject and collection of the cases and
is often cited to sustain the principal proposition. It was, however, overruled

by Ex parte Creasy infra.
Contra: Ex parte Creary, 243 Mo. 680, 148 S. W 914, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
478 (1912), Richardson v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 497, 133 S. W 213 (1911),
In re Elliston, 256 Mo. 378, 165 S. W 987 (1914). Harrell v. Word, 54 Ga.
649 (1875) turns upon a specific constitutional provision.
168 State v. Brownell, 79 Ore. 123, 154 P 428 (1916), Anderson v. Indianapolis Drop Forging Co., 34 Ind. App. 100, 72 N. E. 277 (1904), State v.
Clancy, 30 Mont. 193, 76 P 10 (1904), Hale v. State, 55 Oh. St. 210, 45 N. E.
199 (1888), Burke v. Territory, 2 Okla. 499, 37 P 829 (1894), Wyatt v.
People, 17 Colo. 252, 28 P. 961 (1896), Langdon v. Wayne Circuit Judges,
76 Mich. 358, 43 N. W 310 (1889), Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436 (1880),
People v. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 P. 167 (1893).
Thus until the court acts in excess of or contrary to the statute the defendant
can not raise the question. See, State v. Thomas, 74 Kan. 360, 86 P. 499
(1906), Arnold v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 300, 44 A. R. 480 (1882).
For the same reason a statute making an act of contempt also a crime is
unobjectionable. See, Ex parte Morris, 194- Cal. 63, 227 P 914 (1924).
169 If the problem of jury trial is concerned there is also a question of the
delegation of judicial power.
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tion of the courts to certain specified subject matter, there is
not a conclusive objection to it, for constitutions commonly
provide that the courts shall have such jurisdiction as the
legislative shall prescribe. 170
In the field of contempt, however, a statute which is in
terms of jurisdiction could very properly be interpreted as
71
fixing a minimum and not a maximum standard.1
If the statute is in terms of substance or procedure it may
well be that a fair interpretation of it is that in the absence
of an express provision to the contrary it sets minimum and
not maximum standards.172 If it expressly attempts to set
maximum standards and is invalid as an invasion of the judicial function any rationalization of the result is at odds with
the basic assumptions so far made. There are innumerable
cases which give to legislative declarations on substantive law
constitutional and actual finality when the doctrine of the separation of powers is concerned. The practical effects are
measured by the due process clauses and not the doctrine of
the separation of powers. And there is no efficacy in the due
process clauses if all substantive legislation is to be measured
by the latter doctrine. The stumbling block here is, however,
that an individual may challenge substantive, procedural or
jurisdictional legislation under the due process clauses, but the
courts may not.' 73 The practical result is that as against the
courts in this connection there is no constitutional limitation
on the power of the legislature, unless it be by an extension of
the doctrine of the separation of powers or the supremacy of
the courts. That the legislature ought not to have the power
to materially interfere with the judicial processes by asserting an unlimited right to legislate in the field of contempt
seems reasonably clear and the cases holding invalid maximum
legislation in the field of contempt can fairly be said to rest
on a rather substantial basis as a practical matter. The
result is that legislation which actually encumbers the judicial
170 This problem is discussed later.
171 See, e. g., so holding, Ex parte Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 177 P 162 (1918).
Contra: Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. 505 (1873).
172 See supra n. 167.
173 The due process clauses protect the individual against state action but
do not protect the state against itself.
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process and which as a practical matter does seriously interfere with it is invalid. The formal result is that the doctrine
of the supremacy of the courts requires an independent judiciary and thus by implication deprives the legislature of its
power to legislate on that subject and to that extent. The test
is a practical one, and there may well be a distinction between
so-called criminal and civil contempt,17 4 and a statute which
deals with procedural aspects of the problem solely may like1 75
wise easily be upheld.
On the same basis it has more or less uniformly been held
that admission to the bar, and the discipline of attorneys constitute subject-matter exclusively within the judicial power. 178
Judicial rules on the subject of procedure likewise have been
77
sustained for similar reasons.

It has often been urged that the indeterminate sentence laws
constitute an invasion of the judicial function. With few exceptions, however, the argument has been repudiated and
such laws have been upheld.178 There is in truth no sub174 The courts have sometimes held that legislation on criminal contempt
is prohibited whereas legislation on civil contempt may be valid. See, Michaelson v. United State, 266 U. S. 42, 35 A. L. R. 451 (1924), In re Oldham, 89 N.
C. 23, 45 A. R. 673 (1883).
Cf. Marians v. People, 69 Colo. 87, 169 P 155 (1917) holding that a constitutional provision allowing the recall of judges and the filing of a petition
giving the reason for the recall operated to give a privilege for an otherwise
contemptuous act. But quaere?
175 State v. McClaugherty, 33 W Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407 (1889).
176 In re Paul Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W (2nd) 672 (1933), State v.
Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W 441 (1932), People v. Stockyards State Bank,
344- Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931), In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass.
607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932), Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 437, 281 P
1018 (1929), note, 66 A. L. R. 1512.
177 State, ex rel. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P 770 (1928), in re
Constitutionality of Section 251.18 Wisconsin Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W
717 (1931).
178Ex parle Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P 958 (1918), People v. Warden, 55
Misc. Rep. 22, 105 N. Y. S. 551 (1907), People v. Madden, 120 App. Div.
338, 105 N. Y. S. 554 (1907), State v. Peters, 43 Oh. St. 629, 4 N. E. 81
(1885), Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 152 S. E. 76 (1930), Commonwealth v.
Sweeney, 281 Pa. 550, 127 A. 226 (1924), State v. Dugan, 84 N. J. L. 603, 89
A. 691 (1913) affd. 85 N. J. L. 730, 89 A. 1135, Commonwealth v. McKenty,
82 Pa. Super. Ct. 332 (1912), People v. Cook, 147 Mich. 127, 110 N. W 514
(1907), Wilson v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 341, 132 S. W 557 (1910), State
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stance to the argument against them upon this score. They
involve two different features. First they regulate the amount
of the sentence, second they regulate the execution of the sentence, through boards of parol and pardon. The first is obviously legislative because it deals with the measure of the punishment for the crime, it lays down rules as to the conduct
of the individual toward the state. The difficulty has arisen
out of the fact that most statutes of this character are in terms
of what the court "shall do" in imposing sentence, which however is an inept way of saying what the defendant ought to
be compelled to do if he is found guilty If the language of
the statute had been that "as punishment for the crime the
defendant shall serve time in the penitentiary as follows" the
objection would not often have been raised ;179 but it is clear
that the statute means no more than that although in terms it
is solely directed at the court's action.
The second phase of the indeterminate sentence laws, that
is the pardon and parol feature, quite obviously deal with the
regulation of executive matters so far as the individual is concerned. Action which mitigates the defendant's punishment
cannot be questioned ;180 nor can the state well question its own
liberality As to whether or not such rules shall be enforced
and to what extent they shall be enforced are quite clearly not
judicial matters. For the same reason legislation prohibiting
the dismissal of criminal proceedings,""' or prohibiting the
suspension of sentence 8 2 is valid.
v. Stephenson, 69 Kan. 405, 874, 76 P 905, 77 P 582, 105 A. S. R. 171 (1904),
Madjorous v. State, 24 Ohio App. 146, 156 N. E. 916 (1927), State v. Constantino, 76 Vt. 192, 56 A. 110 (1904), State v. Page, 60 Kan. 664, 59 P.
514 (1899).
Contra: Commonwealth v. Halloway, 42 Pa. St. 446, 82 A. D. 526 (1862),
Ex parte Darling, 16 Nev. 98,.40 A. R. 495 (1881), Ex parte Woodburn, 32
Nev. 136, 104 P 245 (1909), People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N. W
310, 14 L. R. A. 285 (1891). In the first three cases cited contra the act was
retroactive. How this makes any difference is hard to perceive.
179 The problem is the same as that involved in so called "expository or

interpretative" statutes discussed above.
180 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U. S.480 (1927).
181 State v. Costen, 141 Tenn. 539, 213 S. W 910 (1919).
182 Wilson v. State, 124 Ark. 477, 187 S.W 440 (1916), State v. Owen,
80 N. H. 426, 117 A. 814 (1922).
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It follows that in general legislation fixing the terms of punishment for criminal action is not an invasion of the judicial
function, 8 3 nor is an act pardoning offenses, 184 nor regulating
the place where the sentence is to be served. 185
If, however, a third person has a legal interest in the criminal judgment, as in the older cases of imprisonment for debt,
it has been held that the state may not as against him suspend
the execution of it, 186 although as between the state and the
87
defendant such a statute is valid.'
A statute compelling a city to pay a judgment rendered
against it clearly does not invade the judicial function. 8 8
183 Lakes v. Goodloe, 195 Ky. 240, 242 S. W 632 (1922) (allowing first
offender to be released on giving bond), People v. Palm, 24-5 Mich. 396, 223
N. W 67 (1929) (making life imprisonment mandatory for fourth offenders),
State v. Hockett, 70 Ia. 442, 30 N. W 742 (1886) (fixing punishment for murder at life imprisonment or death). For the same reason a statute permitting
the suspension of sentence is valid, because after all the measure of punishment is fixed in terms of the judge's discretion. See, e. g., People v. Stickle,
156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W 497 (1909).
184 State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74, 7 A. R. 600 (1870).
185 Ex parte Cassidy, 13 R. I. 143 .(1880) (in this case the statute was
applied to one already sentenced), Neal v. State, 180 Ark. 333, 21 S. W (2nd)
864 (1929) (semble).
186 Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aikens, 121 (Vt. 1825), Keith v. Ware, 2 Vt. 174
(1830), Lyman v. Mower, 2 Vt. 517 (1830), Kendall v. Dodge, 3 Vt. 360
(1830). The real basis of these cases is that there is an interference with
vested rights and now with the judicial function, unless the act be construed
to contradict the judgment.
18
7 In re Nichols, 8 R. I. 50 (1864).
18 8 People v. City of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 206 (1858).

